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PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Paul R. Baier*

I.
A.

ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Warrantless Arrest

(1) Authority of Louisiana State Police
May a state trooper arrest a motorist within city limits for driving while intoxicated, an offense against the state,' or is enforcement
of the law within incorporated municipalities exclusively the job of
local police officers? And how can defense counsel raise this jurisdictional point anyway in light of the usual rule that an illegal arrest
by itself, without an accompanying seizure of evidence,' is no bar to
the prosecution? State v. Swain' settles the issue in favor of allowing
state police officers to enforce the law within cities, provided the local
police chief has formally requested general law enforcement assistance from the Department of Public Safety.' What is more interesting about the case, however, is the way the merits were reached. No
motion to suppress evidence under article 703 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was filed: there was no evidence to suppress in the case,
and courts have refused to block the whole of the state's case on
account of illegal arrests or unlawful searches and seizures.5 Nor
could defense counsel file a motion to quash the prosecution under
article 531 of the Code; an illegal arrest is no basis in law for quashing
a subsequent valid indictment or information.' Rather, the defense
interposed an evidentiary objection at trial claiming that the arresting officer could not testify without the state first establishing the
officer's authority to arrest within city limits. The trial court sustained this objection, effectively gutting the state's case. On writs,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:98 (1950).
2. Compare Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.

643 (1961).
3. 292 So. 2d 495 (La. 1974).
4. The court relied on LA. R.S. 40:1391 (1950), which provides in pertinent part:

"The department of public safety may, on request of any chief police officer of any
local government unit in the state, assist such officer in the investigation of the circumstances of any crime and in the identification, apprehension, and conviction of the
perpetrators thereof." The court rejected the contention that this statute contemplates
state police aid only in cases of completed offenses.
5. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). In cases of unlawful searches and
seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), calls for the exclusion of the unlawfully
seized evidence or the fruits thereof; but Mapp is no bar to the prosecution's proceeding
against defendant on the basis of other lawful evidence.
6. See State v. Simpson, 247 La. 883, 175 So. 2d 255 (1965).
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the Louisiana supreme court reversed and remanded for trial but
without saying anything about the unique way in which defense counsel nudged the court to reach the merits in the case. No doubt it was
important for the court to rule on the authority of state police to aid
local law enforcement, and the holding in the case improves the effective administration of criminal justice in Louisiana. But the failure
of the court to mention the procedural context in Swain is surprising.
Surely good defense lawyers will argue that it is now open in Louisiana to contest the legality vel non of an arrest by interposing an
objection at trial to the testimony of the arresting officer, and the
supreme court will have to speak to this procedural point sooner or
later. When it does, it will probably disallow such objections as contrary to law. Still, State v. Swain is a credit to the ingenuity of the
defense bar and a lesson to aspiring criminal proceduralists. If there
is no vehicle on the books for raising a particular point, never hesitate
to fashion your own procedure toward forcing an adjudication on the
merits; that, after all, is what procedure is for.'
(2) Stop and Frisk-Article 215.1
Terry v. Ohio,' decided in 1968, is the seminal stop-and-frisk
opinion of the United States Supreme Court, and after six years it is
easy enough to recite its essential holding: a police officer investigating crime in the field is
permit[ted] a reasonable search for weapons for the protection
of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime.
This Terry case spawned much legislation in the states, including
article 215.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure," authorizing the police to stop and frisk suspected criminals in certain limited
7. On occasion the supreme court itself has fashioned new procedures where the
Code provided none. In State v. Wilkerson, 261 La. 342, 259 So. 2d 871 (1972), the court
approved the practice of motions to suppress identification testimony even though
nothing in the Code authorized such motions. The court relied in part on its general
supervisory authority over Louisiana's criminal procedure spelled out in article 3 of the
Code.
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9. Id. at 27.
10. Article 215.1 was added to the Code by La. Acts 1968, No. 305 (July 20, 1968).
Terry was decided by the United States Supreme Court approximately one month
before this, in June, 1968. Of course, much legislation had also preceded the Terry
opinion. For a comprehensive survey see Comment, 29 LA. L. REV. 523 (1969).
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circumstances. Most of the cases arising since 1968 have involved, as
did Terry," evidence of crime discovered during "pat downs" of suspects, that is, on the "frisk" side of stop and frisk. But what about
evidence encountered on the "stop" side? For instance, when the
police stop a car for investigation on reasonable suspicion, may they
order the occupants out and then look for evidence of crime in the
automobile? How far, in other words, will "the governmental interest
in investigating crime"' 2 carry the police-into the car? All Terry tells
us in this regard is that a police officer may "in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner"' 3 approach a person for purposes of criminal investigation even though there is no probable cause
to make an arrest. Similarly the Court in Terry refers to "legitimate
police investigative techniques" 4 but never states what these legitimate techniques are.
During the 1972-73 term, the Louisiana supreme court skirted
the problem of specifying the ways in which police may exercise their
authority under article 215.1(A) of the Code. 5 During the current
term, however, the court with Justice Tate writing for the majority
held (1) that police may stop a car for purposes of investigatory
questioning of the occupants where "reasonable cause"'" for the detention exists; (2) that on stopping the car police may "identify the
driver and shine their flashlight over the occupants and the interior
of the car";7 and (3) that evidence of crime discovered in plain view
during this flashlight look into the automobile is admissible against
defendant at trial. 8 Thus as a constitutional matter our supreme
court considers an officer's quick glance into a stopped car a legitimate investigative technique reasonably limited in scope by its
merely investigatory purposes."9 This result, it is important to note,
11. "The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden's
taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there
was justification for McFadden's invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him
for weapons in the course of that investigation." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968).
12. Id. at 23.
13. Id. at 22.
14. Id. at 13.
15. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Criminal Procedure 1, 34 LA. L. REv. 396, 401-03 (1974).
16. See State v. Jefferson, 284 So. 2d 882, 884 (La. 1973). Justice Tate in the
Jefferson opinion seems to use "reasonable cause" and "probable cause" interchangeably. Whether there is any difference between this reasonable cause standard and the
standard of article 215.1(A) of the Code ("reasonably suspects") was not considered
by the court.
17. State v. Jefferson, 284 So. 2d 882, 885 (La. 1973) (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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carries the police beyond what is expressly authorized in article
215.1(A) of the Code,"° but it is unlikely the legislature intended
subsection A to delimit the investigatory steps the police may take
on reasonable suspicion. When article 215.1 was added to the Code
in 1968, the law on this point was quite unclear. Now with State v.
Jefferson" in the jurisprudence, Louisiana has taken a forthright step
forward toward balancing the state's interest in investigating crime
and the people's interest in individual liberty.
The court's opinion in Jefferson is curious in two respects and
cautious in another. Nowhere is article 215.1 directly cited in the
opinion, and a natural question is why not? Perhaps the article is
irrelevant on the facts; literally 215.1 deals only with suspects (on
foot?) in public places, whereas the court extended its discussion to
any suspect "whether that person be on foot, horseback or in an
automobile."" The opinion in Jefferson is also curious because it
legitimates the police conduct in the case on a theory different from
that used in the field by the stopping officer, i.e., "mere suspicion of
speeding." While there is nothing unusual about this after-the-fact
rationalization by an appellate court," there is a respectable view
20. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 215.1(A) allows a police officer to demand of the
individual stopped "his name, address and an explanation of his actions"; but the
article says nothing about stopping cars and looking inside of them as a proper investigative step. That the fourth amendment allows officers to stop cars and to investigate
in a legitimate way on reasonable suspicion of crime is clear, however. See Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Attorney General Guste recently issued an opinion considering the effect on the
authority of the police under article 215.1(A) of a suspect's failure to identify himself
properly. The Attorney General expressed the view that an arrest based on the failure
of a suspect to identify himself would be illegal and would probably subject the arresting officer to a suit for false arrest. LA. Op. Ary. GEN. (Jan. 20, 1974).
21. 284 So. 2d 882 (La. 1973).
22. Id. at 884.
23. Anthony Amsterdam made this point in his Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures,
delivered at the University of Minnesota Law School in January, 1974: "I can tell you
that there is often little relationship between the grounds upon which the police take
action and the grounds later put forward to justify their action in the courts. When a
prosecuting attorney is assigned a case in which he must defend a particular police
action, he hits the law books and determines the best legal grounds upon which the
action can be sustained. He then advances such of those grounds as the record does or
can be made to support, ordinarily without asking whether the police would or will
generally act upon those grounds or did so in his particular case. He advances whatever
considerations in support of a police practice seem to him to be likely to persuade the
court to adopt a rule sustaining it, without regard to whether the police themselves
view the considerations as important or even relevant." Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. LA. Rav. 349, 420 (1974).
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that courts should not overindulge the police on appellate review. 4
Finally, the opinion is cautious in its emphasis of the limited scope
of the investigatory act upheld in Jefferson. The police may keep
their eyes open when investigating crime and they may even look into
a car for evidence of crime lying in plain view; but "a search incident
to such inquiry would not be lawful" 2 -that is, it is unlikely the court
would allow the police to enter a stopped car for closer investigatory
scrutiny. 6
B.

Search and Seizure

(1) Warrantless Car Searches on Probable Cause
The path of the law on car searches is no straight highway; it's
more a country road-bumpy and unsure of itself (or so it seems to
the traveller). And tracking the fourth amendment in the United
States Supreme Court is more difficult these days because the
Court's membership has changed so drastically in such a short period
of time. From the cases, it appears this changing membership is
determined to reverse the direction which criminal procedure took in
the early sixties, and it seems fair to say we have a new Warren
Court-Warren Burger's, that is. Similarly, our own Louisiana search
and seizure cases, like those most recently down from the Burger
Court,27 allow the police to search a car on probable cause, but without a warrant, even in situations where no real exigency confronts the
police. When this happens the justices are usually divided and the
division is over fundamental fourth amendment principles. State v.
Tant" is such a case.
In Tant, a police officer claimed to have reliable information
from an informant that a certain car contained marijuana. On the
basis of this information the officer believed he could have secured a
search warrant for the car, but he didn't. Instead, the car was kept
under surveillance for twenty-four hours in an effort to discover the
source of the drug. During this period the car was parked outside
defendant's residence. The next day when Tant finally got into the
car, the police followed him on the interstate and stopped him within
24. Cf. Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 600, 606 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting from the dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
25. State v. Jefferson, 284 So. 2d 882, 884 (La. 1973) (emphasis added).
26. The court considered it important in Jefferson that "[tlhere is no indication
but that, had nothing more suspicious been observed, the vehicle and its occupants
would have been permitted to go on their way without further invasion of their privacy." Id. at 885.
27. Cardwell v. Lewis, 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974), is the latest case.
28. 287 So. 2d 458 (La. 1973).
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four miles of the parish line. The police searched the car and found a
suitcase full of marijuana in the trunk. For the majority, it made no
difference that the exigency in the case-the fact that the car was
traveling on the interstate and about to leave the parish-arose after
the police had had enough time to apply for a warrant. As Justice
Calogero put it, "it is not necessary that the probable cause which
gives rise to the search arise coincidentally with the occurrence of
the exigent or unforeseeable circumstance."" It is a credit to the
prescience of the majority that six months later the Burger Court
said exactly the same thing.'" Furthermore, the fact that the police
allowed twenty-four hours to pass without attempting to secure a
warrant did not preclude them from relying on the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement. Nothing in the fourth
amendment requires that a police officer immediately obtain a search
warrant on gaining probable cause for its issuance; to the contrary,
the majority said an officer may desist even indefinitely, provided the
delay is not a pretext for avoiding the probable cause determination
of an impartial magistrate. Thus, "it is permissible for police to exercise discretion in not immediately obtaining a search warrant in...
the effort to uncover further violations of the law."'"
To the writer, the opinion in Tant seems lopsided in favor of "the
general aims and needs of law enforcement." 3 But there are two sides
to the meaning of the fourth amendment. "ITIhe deepest values of
our social order set limits upon how far the police may go, even in
the indispensable work of investigating and apprehending criminal
malefactors. ' '33 One of the great lessons of the fourth amendment's
history is that, unless absolutely necessary, the police should not be
given the discretion to search or not to search on their own suspicioncharged judgments of probable cause. That is why the warrant requirement exists in the first place and why Justices Tate and Barham
dissented in Tant. For them and for the writer, the majority's approach "undermine[s] the policy of the Fourth Amendment that
29. Id. at 460.
30. "Assuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case or
principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not
obtained at the first practicable moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only
at the time of arrest." Cardwell v. Lewis, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 2472 (1974).
31. State v. Tant, 287 So. 2d 458, 461 (La. 1973).
32. Id.
33. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
380 (1974).
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interposes judicial determination of probable cause between police
activity and individual privacy."34
Where one comes out in Tant depends inescapably on an exercise
of judgment; simply reading the fourth amendment provides no answer. Surely the effort of the police in Tant to uncover further violations of the law by keeping the suspected car under surveillance
makes good sense. But so does the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, and that is especially true in a case where the officer's
belief ("I could have obtained a warrant") is largely subjective. The
majority in Tant never stops to examine whether probable cause
objectively existed in the case. The fact that "the officer believed that
he had sufficient knowledge to establish probable cause to the satisfaction of a magistrate" is not enough under the controlling cases. 5
The court must make its own independent determination of probable
facts. "Mere affirmance of belief or
cause on the basis of objective
'3
suspicion is not enough.
In light of the compelling interests on both sides in Tant, this
writer would propose a different solution for similar cases in the future. Under article 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the police
are entitled to wait up to ten days before executing a search warrant.
The article thus allows the police to continue their criminal investigation before executing the warrant in the hope of catching others. Yet
this is precisely the reason the majority gives for not requiring the
police to obtain a warrant-hardly a rational integration of our Code
of Criminal Procedure into constitutional adjudication. A better rule
would be to require the police to obtain a warrant in cases like Tant
where there is enough time antecedent to any exigent circumstance
to apply for one. The police need not, however, execute the warrant
right away. Then if an exigent circumstance arises later, as it did in
Tant, the police may stop the car and search it for the items specified
in the warrant. Only next time when this happens the driver will have
the constitutional protection due him: a neutral and detached magistrate, not a police officer, will have determined there is probable
cause for the search.
In another car case, State v. Smith, 7 the Louisiana supreme
court again correctly anticipated what the Burger Court would later
hold on similar facts.38 After defendants' arrest, police officers with34.
Morgan
35.
36.
37.
38.

State v. Tant, 287 So. 2d 458, 462 (La. 1973) (Tate, J., dissenting). See also
v. Neff, 94 S. Ct. 1460 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
283 So. 2d 470 (La. 1973).
See Cardwell v. Lewis, 94 S. Ct. 2464 (1974).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

out a search warrant seized two cars parked at a motel and towed
them to a police auto pound where they were later searched. Chief
Justice Sanders in his opinion for the court upheld the warrantless
seizure of the automobiles because at the time of the seizure the
police had probable cause to believe evidence of crime would be found
in the vehicles and "[iut would certainly have been unreasonable to
require the police, after having arrested the defendants, to guard the
vehicle at the motel while the search warrant was being secured."39
But this statement is hard to appreciate-like a bump in a country
road. Just why was posting a guard unreasonable? The cars were
immobilized at the motel and the defendants were in custody. Moreover, a team of officers actually seized the cars, and so it was at least
physically possible to post a guard at the motel while other officers
secured a search warrant. Still, the law, especially Chambers v.
Maroney, 0 is with Chief Justice Sanders, and not with Justice Barham, who dissented in the case.
State v. Alderman4' is also worth mentioning because in it the
court sustained the authority of agents of the Louisiana Wildlife and
Fisheries Commission on routine patrol to conduct warrantless
searches of cars provided probable cause exists to believe the car
searched is involved in violations of the game laws. So far, the holding
is pedestrian. What is really exciting about this car case, however, is
to recognize the role the state legislature played in fashioning the
particular exception to the warrant requirement at issue in
Alderman-that is, a specific statute" authorized the warrantless
conduct upheld in the case. This amounts to constitutional rulemaking under the fourth amendment, a development of profound significance. For if the state legislature, or indeed police departments
themselves, were to adopt written rules delimiting the circumstances
in which an officer may search without a warrant, then the knotty
problem of applying the fourth amendment in the field would no
longer be the exclusive job of the cop on the beat, as it is now. Even
self-imposed rules or statements of policy would do much to contain
police discretion and to avoid the potential for abuse of lawenforcement powers in the field. This is the crucial issue as some
fourth amendment buffs see it.43 Of course, the courts would retain
39.
40.
41.
42.

State v. Smith, 283 So. 2d 470, 472 (La. 1973).
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
285 So. 2d 193 (La. 1973).
LA. R.S. 56:108 (1950).
43. See ABA STANDARDS, URBAN POLICE FUNCTION §§ 7-9 (1973); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 88 (1969); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58
MINN.

L. REv. 349, 416-39 (1974); Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforce-
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final responsibility to adjudicate the constitutional reasonableness of
these departmental rules under the fourth amendment, but there is
no good reason for not requiring police departments to fashion their
own agency rules in the first instance. To wait until the courts declare
in their ad hoc way what the rules of the field are may be too late-for
the police as well as for the people.
(2) Plain View and Consent Cases
Evidence of crime in plain view of the police may be seized
without a warrant provided the police inadvertently come across the
evidence in the course of some other lawful intrusion against the
accused. This is the so-called "plain-view" exception to the warrant
requirement, an exception well established in the cases." State v.
Hills45 applies the doctrine in a case where the police, who are at the
scene investigating a burglary, rush into an apartment through an
unlocked door in response to a scream for help. Justice Tate's opinion
for the court thoroughly reviews the criteria for application of the
plain-view doctrine and concludes that the police are not unlawfully
intruding when they instinctively rush into an apartment in response
to a cry for help. This was not a case of the police themselves manufacturing the circumstances which allow a look around. Hence, once
lawfully in the apartment, the police could seize the stolen property
that was in plain view on the living room floor. State v. Pettle41 is to
the same effect, where the evidence "was in plain view of a law
enforcement officer who had a right to be at the location at which the
47
view was obtained.'
Two plain-view cases decided during this term of court are extremely important to the defense bar. In each case the Louisiana
supreme court reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana,
holding the crucial evidence inadmissible at trial. To anyone who
reads the advance sheets regularly, these results are striking enough:
there are few reversals on defense counsel's claim that evidence was
unconstitutionally seized and used against defendant at trial. But
there is something more to these two cases than just the fact of
reversal. What is really significant is the way the court reversed. In
both cases the court rejected the state's plain-view claim, notwithment Agencies, 36 LAw & CONTEMP.PROB. 500 (1971); McGowan, Rule-Making and the
Police, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 659 (1972).
44. "It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who
has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
introduced in evidence." Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
45. 283 So. 2d 220 (La. 1973).
46. 286 So. 2d 625 (La. 1973).
47. Id. at 628-29.
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standing the fact that these claims were supported in each instance
by the record testimony of police officers. Ordinarily in this appellate
posture one would expect the supreme court to affirm; the court
rarely overrules a trial judge on an evidentiary point where policeofficer testimony supports the lower court's ruling. But twice this
term the supreme court did just that, and it is important to know how
and why.
State v. Hargiss8 is the first of these cases. In it the police claim
to find marijuana in plain view in an open tape recorder case on the
front floor of defendant's car. If the arresting officers are believed,
then there was no search because, as Chief Justice Sanders pointed
out in his opinion for the court, the plain-view doctrine "is not a true
exception to the search warrant requirement, for the theory is that
such objects are taken without a search."4 This was the conclusion
reached by the trial judge in the case. On the other hand, if the
arresting officers are engaged in an unlawful search at the time they
discover the incriminating evidence, then the plain-view doctrine
does not apply; and this later conclusion was the unanimous view of
the supreme court in Hargiss. To put it bluntly, the supreme court
just didn't believe the arresting officers discovered the marijuana in
plain view, regardless of the conclusion reached by the trial court.
The Chief Justice pointed to several factors which convinced the
court that the evidence was not in plain view: (1) the contraband was
seized at night, and thus the physical environment was not conducive
to plain view; (2) one of the arresting officers testified he previously
drove defendant's car during the day and saw nothing in it to attract
his attention; (3) the other officer also inspected the car and discovered nothing unusual; (4) there was testimony from one of the officers
that the police intended to search defendant's automobile; and finally (5) the arresting officers' testimony as to the details of finding
the marijuana was contradictory.'" Viewing all these factors together,
the record in Hargiss is unusual, and it is unlikely that a case exactly
like this one will ever reach the court again. Still, the supreme court
has now shown itself chary of plain-view claims where the record in
the case viewed as a whole undermines the claim. That the court is
willing to subject the record in these plain-view cases to the court's
own vigorous and independent scrutiny is a welcome development.
In the second case, State v. Meichel,1 a marshall removes a
bottle of pills from defendant's car and claims the bottle was in open
48.
49.
50.
51.

288 So. 2d 633 (La. 1974).
Id. at 635.
Id.
290 So. 2d 878 (La. 1974).
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view on the front seat of the vehicle. The label on the bottle indicates
the pills are habit-forming and that dispensing them without a prescription is prohibited. Once more the circumstances surrounding the
seizure are controverted: the defendant claims the officer entered the
automobile and searched it, finding the pills in a closed console between the bucket seats of the car. After retrieving the bottle, the
police search the car and discover marijuana in the trunk. The admissibility of the marijuana at trial depends on the legality of the marshal's taking the bottle of pills in the first place. If the bottle was
lawfully seized, it gave the police probable cause to search the car for
contraband and they could then seize the marijuana. This was the
trial court's conclusion in the case.
On appeal, the Louisiana supreme court-again making up its
own mind about what the record showed-reversed the lower court's
plain-view ruling, although this time the court split 4-3. Writing for
the majority, Justice Dixon emphasized that the word "evidence" in
the plain-view formula is a word of limitation-that is, a policeman
does not have the right to seize any object in his view in order to
examine it and determine if it is evidence of crime. To the contrary,
an object may be seized only when it is readily apparent to the police
that the object is contraband or evidence; and as the majority read
the record, the officer who seized the bottle of pills did not know the
nature of the pills until after he picked up the bottle and examined
it. The court said this kind of seizure does not fall within the plainview exception to the warrant requirement, and thus seizure of the
pills was unlawful and the subsequent seizure of the marijuana in the
trunk of the car was tainted by the initial illegality. For the three
dissenting justices, the record in the case read differently. They voted
to apply the plain-vieW doctrine, apparently on the theory that the
marshal knew the bottle contained contraband immediately on
seeing it, without having to pick it up and examine it. It's difficult
to say which side is right in the case, however, because the town
marshal's testimony on the plain-view issue is not set out in either
the majority or the dissenting opinions.
A second issue also divided the court in State v. Meichel: Did
the defendant consent to the warrantless search of his car? At trial
Meichel and a companion denied that they had given the police permission to search the car. But the arresting officers testified to the
contrary." It appears from the report that the trial court believed the
52. The town marshal testified: "They told us to go ahead and search the car that
they didn't have anything to hide." Another officer testified: "I believe Meichel there
he said that they could and said there wasn't anything in there." One deputy sheriff
testified: "They said, yes, sir, said ya'll can search, said we don't have anything in the
car that we care for ya'll seeing." Id. at 881-82.
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arresting officers and not the defendant, and in this situation what
the court said last term in State v. Pitts" would seem relevant: "The
factual determination of the trial court regarding the validity of the
consent should be given great weight, and it will not be disturbed on
review unless clearly erroneous. '54 In light of the record testimony of
the police officers in Meichel, one would guess the reviewing court
would affirm Meichel's conviction on account of his consent to an
otherwise unlawful search and seizure.
But a majority of the court in Meichel, overruling the trial court
again, held there was no valid consent. The majority did not say, as
it had on the plain-view issue in the case, that it disbelieved the
state's consent claim. Rather, the majority said all three of the arresting officers misconstrued what the defendant said to them. What the
defendant and his companion said to the police was "they didn't care
for us searching," which means, according to the majority's way of
hearing, "Don't search." 5
To this writer, the majority opinion in Meichel looks disingenuous. The one statement "they didn't care for us searching" is really
ambiguous in light of the patois of the arresting police officers. Moreover, anyone familiar with the appellate process knows how easy it is
on appeal to parse the trial testimony of a particular witness and then
to reach just about any conclusion desired, and this is what the majority seems to be doing in Meichel. Contrariwise, Chief Justice Sanders recited the whole of the three arresting officers' testimony in his
dissenting opinion, and reading this fuller recitation leaves one fairly
convinced that, according to the police, defendant consented in the
case. Something else, it seems, must have been on the majority's
mind, but what? It could very well be that Justice Dixon, who wrote
the majority opinion, and Justices Tate, Barham, and Calogero are
inching towards a rule of law that would preclude the state altogether
from relying on consent as an exception to the warrant requirement
where the search is otherwise unlawful and where there is no good
reason other than "peaceful submission to a presumed lawful request" for thinking a suspect would allow the search knowing it will
53. 263 La. 38, 267 So. 2d 186 (La. 1972).
54. Id. at 41-42, 267 So. 2d at 187-88.
55. "Whether the officers were under the impression that they had consent to

search is not determinative. The testimony of the officers shows that the basis for such
impression was erroneous. The statement attributed to the defendant does not constitute consent. The defendant denied consent and misconstruction of the statement by
the police does not change the character of the denial." State v. Meichel, 290 So. 2d
878, 881 (La. 1974).
56. State v. Amphy, 259 La. 161, 174, 249 So. 2d 560, 565 (1971).
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turn up incriminating evidence. A few cases 7 outside of Louisiana
would support this bold new position, and so would the writer for the
reason that
the very idea that any defendant would consent to an otherwise
unlawful search seems to defy human experience. An obvious fact
of life cuts the other way. Unless coerced, a suspect with red
hands will always try to keep them in his pockets. 8
It could very well be that the majority in Meichel thought it incredible that a suspect who denied his guilt would have consented to a
search which he knew would disclose contraband or evidence of
crime. Moreover, a statement tacked onto the end of the majority
opinion in Meichel supports all this speculation. The court said it
rejected the state's consent claim because "[a]n analysis of the evidence of the circumstances, nature and quality of the contended consent"5 9 showed there was no consent to search the car. What circumstances was the court talking about? Maybe what was bothering the
court was the realization that, generally speaking, suspects with red
hands will always try to keep them in their pockets. If this idea were
rigorously applied in the cases, then most consent claims would have
to be rejected as inherently incredible; and the court may well be
moving in that direction. Whether there is any rule like this beneath
the surface of the majority opinion in Meichel is for the future.
(3) Search Warrants
A basic constitutional rule in the area of search and seizure is
that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." ' 0 Article 162 of the Code provides in
part:
A search warrant may issue only upon probable cause established
to the satisfaction of the judge, by the affidavit of a credible
person, reciting facts establishing the cause for issuance of the
warrant.
57. See, e.g., Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951). And in United
States v. Shropshire, 271 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1967), the court declared it incredible
that a suspect who denied his guilt would have consented to a search which he knew
would disclose incriminating evidence.
58. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 TermCriminal Procedure 1, 34 LA. L. REV. 396, 414 (1974).
59. State v. Meichel, 290 So. 2d 878, 882 (La. 1974).
60. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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During the 1973-74 term the Louisiana supreme court decided several
important search warrant cases involving all three of the essential
requirements under article 162: (1) probable cause for the search, (2)
facts establishing cause for issuing the warrant recited in the affidavit, and (3) a credible affiant.
1
condemns a search warrant for failure to
State v. Kuhlman"
meet the probable cause requirement. All the police knew in the case
was that a drug pusher, who was arrested for selling some cocaine in
a restaurant, had stopped at defendant's house for about three minutes just before the sale. But to justify the search of a home, "more
is needed than the possibility or suspicion that a seller of contraband
had picked it up from a residence he had visited en route to the place
of the sale, at least without further indication that the source of the
contraband was the home rather than possession prior to the visit."6
The majority opinion in State v. Linkletter" reviews the constitutional requirement that there must be a sufficient factual basis
under "oath or affirmation" 4 to support the magistrate's finding of
probable cause. "Mere affirmation of belief or suspicion is not
enough,"" and that's all the affidavit in Linkletter contained, as the
majority saw it. Without a recitation of the underlying facts explaining the belief that Linkletter possessed stolen property, the magistrate could not make his own independent determination of probable
cause, which is what the constitution requires. The majority opinion
goes on to point out that article 162 of the Code mirrors the constitutional requirement of a sufficient factual basis for determining probable cause, but whether the supporting facts must be entirely contained in the affidavit in writing or whether oral statements under
oath are good enough are questions the majority expressly reserved
for later decision.66
61. 293 So. 2d 159 (La. 1974). The unlawful search and seizure in Kuhlman is
particularly egregious, and reading the case reminds one of the importance of the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
62. Id. at 162.
63. 286 So. 2d 321 (La. 1973).
64. The quoted language is that of the fourth amendment. By contrast, the plain
language of article 162 seems to require that an affidavit be used to set forth the facts
supporting issuance of the search warrant; merely having the officer recite the supporting facts under oath would not be enough.
65. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
66. Justice Summers dissented in Linkletter. He was of the view that an affidavit
under article 162 of the Code may be supplemented by additional information furnished to the magistrate at the time the warrant was issued. Since the judge who issued
the warrant testified at the suppression hearing that there were such additional facts
supporting probable cause, Justice Summers would have sustained the search warrant
in the case. See 286 So. 2d at 328 (Summers, J., dissenting).
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Sometimes it is extremely difficult to decide whether a particular
affidavit demonstrates probable cause, and this is especially true
when the affidavit relies on an informer's tip to establish probable
cause. Under Aguilar v. Texas,"7 two types of evidence must be presented to the magistrate when the affidavit relies on an informer.
First, the affidavit must indicate the underlying circumstances that
lead the informer to conclude evidence is present or crimes are being
committed. Second, the affidavit must show that the informer is
reliable. Clearly State v. Devall"8 meets the two-pronged Aguilar test:
the affidavit recites a detailed factual basis for the informer's conclusion that opium was in the defendant's apartment" and there is also
information from which the magistrate could conclude that the informer was telling the police the truth about the location of the
opium.7 0
By contrast, State v. Paciera7' is a much more difficult case-or
at least Justice Tate's majority opinion makes it seem that way. In
this case the affidavit recites that two New Orleans police officers,
following up on a tip from a confidential informer, learned that a
stolen lawn-hedger was at Paciera's premises. Nothing in the affidavit, however, tells how these two police officers learned that the stolen
property was at Paciera's residence; there are no facts setting forth
the underlying circumstances for the officers' conclusion that evidence was present at defendant's house. So far, there would seem to
be a violation of the factual-basis requirement of the Aguilar case and
of article 162 of the Code, and this was the conclusion reached by
Justice Dixon in his short, one-sentence dissenting opinion." However the majority looked to other recitals in the affidavit and found
them sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements. First, the same in67. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
68. 296 So. 2d 802 (La. 1974).
69. The affidavit states that an informer told the affiant, a captain with the East
Baton Rouge Parish sheriffs office, that he had been in Devall's apartment and had
seen one-half pound of pure opium wrapped in tin foil in an air vent in the ceiling.
The informer knew the substance was opium because he had smoked some of it at the
time he was in Devall's apartment. State v. Devall, 296 So. 2d 802, 804 (La. 1974).
70. The informer was named in the affidavit, and the informer incriminated himself by the statements he gave to the affiant. "Admissions of crime, like admissions
against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility-sufficient at least
to support finding of probable cause to search." United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,
583 (1971) (plurality opinion). Also, the informer had given the police other information which, when checked, proved true.
71. 290 So. 2d 681 (La. 1974).
72. "The affidavit does not disclose source of the information that the stolen goods
were in defendant's premises." State v. Paciera, 290 So. 2d 681, 688 (La. 1974) (Dixon,
J., dissenting).
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former told the police that Paciera was a fence for stolen property.
The affidavit shows that the informer was reliable because he previously gave the police information which helped them solve fifteen
other burglaries. Moreover, on the basis of information provided by
this same informer, the two officers recovered all the items stolen in
the burglary under investigation except the lawn-hedger. There is one
more material recital in the affidavit: a known burglar was seen going
into the Paciera residence during a seven-hour surveillance of the
house. The majority conceded that, by itself, what the affiant personally observed-that he saw a known burglar visiting the Paciera
house-was not probable cause to justify searching the house." But
still Justice Tate went on in a dizzying, six-page opinion to the conclusion that the affidavit was sufficient under the fourth amendment,
although he said the issue was close.
Several factors influenced the majority, and among them the
most important seems to be the fact that the affiant's informants
were identified by name as two New Orleans policemen. These officers had recovered other items of the property stolen in the burglary
under investigation, and there was a substantial factual basis in the
affidavit for believing the officers' conclusion that the last piece of
property was at Paciera's residence. Moreover, as Justice Tate reviewed the controlling precedents on probable cause affidavits, including the latest expression of the United States Supreme Court in
point, United States v. Harris,74 an affidavit is sufficient if
it . . . set[s] forth underlying circumstances and details sufficient to provide a substantial factual basis by which the magistrate might find reliable both the informant and the information
given by him."
But this formulation, if given wide application in future cases, would
seriously undermine the root fourth amendment requirement and the
central idea of article 162 of the Code that a magistrate must reach
his own independent determination of probable cause, regardless of
the reliability of a police officer's ultimate conclusion that evidence
is present at a particular place. Without knowing the circumstances
of the follow-up investigation in Paciera, without knowing how the
officers came to their ultimate conclusion that the lawn-hedger was
at Paciera's, all the magistrate can do in order to issue a warrant is
to trust the officer's conclusion. But that kind of confidence in the
73. State v. Paciera, 290 So. 2d 681, 684 (La. 1974).
74. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
75. State v. Paciera, 290 So. 2d 681, 685-86 (La. 1974).
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police is not allowed, at least as this writer appreciates the fourth
amendment. The majority opinion in Pacieraseems to have twisted,
if not to have snapped off, Aguilar's first prong; and, so far as this
writer knows, nothing in United States Supreme Court cases, not
even Burger Court cases, supports this result."
In addition to the requirement of probable cause, the fourth
amendment and article 162 require a particular description of the
things to be seized under the warrant. The purpose of this specificity
requirement is to limit the discretion of the police regarding the items
to be seized and to prevent the police from generally rummaging
around in search of incriminating evidence. Thus a good affidavit for
a search warrant in Louisiana will show probable cause for each item
named in the warrant.77 That was not the case last term in State v.
Bastida7 1 where the list of items capturable under the warrant included not only automatic pistols, for which there was probable
cause, but also stolen credit cards, for which nothing in the affidavit
5
showed probable cause. This term in State v. Sanchez,"
which was
an appeal by Bastida's co-defendant, the Louisiana supreme court
clarified its earlier ruling in Bastida and held that a leather holster
and twelve .32 caliber bullets were properly admitted as evidence at
trial. These were the only items introduced by the state and they were
items "which clearly were within the scope of the affidavit and as to
which items the search warrant was clearly supported by probable
cause." 80 The fact that the list of items named in the warrant exceeded the scope of the supporting affidavit's showing of probable
cause did not render the warrant wholly invalid, and the majority
concluded that "the existence of surplusage in the warrant caused the
defendant no prejudice.""t Justice Barham disagreed with the court's
conclusion, and in his dissent he made the point that what was ad76. Justice Tate's reliance on United States v. Harrisseems misplaced. There is
nothing in Harristhat suggests that the factual basis requirement regarding how an
informer came to his conclusion that evidence of crime is at a specific place has been
weakened in any way. Harris concerned the reliability of the informer. Although it is
true that regarding informer reliability the Harriscase may have weakened Aguilar's
second prong [see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAv. L. REv. 53-64 (1971)],
Aguilar's factual basis prong seems intact. Nor should Ventresca's preference for warrants, [see United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)], be stretched so far as to
save the warrant in Paciera.
77. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972.1973 TermCriminal Procedure I, 34 LA. L. REV. 396, 407 (1974).
78. 271 So. 2d 854 (La. 1973).
79. 284 So. 2d 918 (La. 1973).
80. Id. at 920.
81. Id.
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mitted at trial, a holster and bullets, was not named in either the
affidavit or the warrant. Moreover, for Justice Barham the warrant
was constitutionally invalid because the list of items in the warrant
exceeded the scope of the affidavit's showing of probable cause, and
so the holster and the bullets should not have been admitted at trial."2
Generally speaking, the scope of a remedy afforded by the
law-the exclusionary rule is an example-is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.83 It would seem, therefore, that the court is right in cases like Sanchez not to apply the
exclusionary remedy to items which are particularly described in the
warrant and for which probable cause is shown in the supporting
affidavit. Also, the majority's dictum to the effect that, when the
warrant lists items beyond the scope of the affidavit's probable cause,
those items are to be suppressed at trial84 is consistent with the general remedial idea that the nature of the wrong determines the scope
of the remedy applied. Finally, although the warrant did not list
either a holster or ammunition for an automatic pistol as things to
be seized, those items are intimately related to automatic pistols, an
item which was listed in the warrant and which was supported by the
affidavit's probable cause. 5 So long as the warrant listed pistols,
allowing the police to seize a holster and ammunition for an automatic pistol would not seem to leave them at large to rummage
around freely, looking for whatever incriminating evidence they could
find.
In one final respect during 1973-74, our supreme court outdistanced even the Burger Court on an important question of search
warrant law: Is it open to a defendant on a motion to suppress to
challenge the veracity of the affiant-usually a police officer-who
swore out the warrant, and may a defendant traverse the accuracy of
the factual averments in the affidavit upon which the search warrant
was issued? The United States Supreme Court has avoided confronting this issue,8" but during the current term the Louisiana supreme
82. Id. at 922 (Barham, J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112, 3127 (1974).
84. State v. Sanchez, 284 So. 2d 918, 920 (La. 1973) (dictum).
85. The majority stated that the holster and ammunition "were within the scope
of the affidavit." Id.
86. The Court expressly reserved the question in Rugendorf v. United States, 376
U.S. 528 (1964). Moreover, during the October 1973 term the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari in North Carolinav. Wrenn, 94 S. Ct. 3180 (1974), a case which
raised the issue of collateral attacks on search warrant affidavits. Justice White, joined
by the Chief Justice, dissented from the denial of certiorari, saying: "Whether a search
warrant and its supporting affidavit, adequate on their face, may be impeached, is
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court reached the question of collateral attack on an affidavit and
held impeachment of either the affiant or of the factual averments
contained in the affidavit is available in Louisiana to a limited extent.
The affidavit trilogy in Louisiana begins with State v. Anselmo. 7
In that case, the only essential question was whether the veracity of
a confidential informer who supplies information relied on in the
affidavit is subject to attack at the hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress evidence seized with the warrant. The court held impeachment of the facts supplied by a confidential informer is unavailable
because of the informer's privilege;8" but the court went on in broad
dicta to the conclusions that probable cause for issuing a warrant is
to be judged from the face of the affidavit itself, and that no collateral
attack on either the affiant's veracity or on any of the factual statements contained in the affidavit, regardless of their source, is permis0
sible. 1 However, last term in State v. George"
a majority of the court
signaled their readiness to restrict Anselmo's non-impeachment rule
to cases involving attacks on informer veracity only, and Justice
Dixon hinted that in the future defense counsel would be allowed to
attack the veracity of affiants other than confidential informers.9
Finally, in companion cases this year Justice Dixon for a 4-3 majority
held that a defendant is entitled to a hearing on well-pleaded allegations of affiant's misrepresentation in the application for a search
warrant.
In State v. Melson," the affiant police officer averred in his application for a warrant that two eyewitnesses to a shooting had identified defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, and a warrant issued
to search defendant's apartment based on the officer's affidavit. The
police found incriminating evidence, but the defendant moved to
squarely presented here. 'The time is right for decision on this question, for the courts
are in conflict and the question is important for the proper administration of criminal
justice.' " 94 S. Ct. at 3182 (White, J., dissenting).
87. 260 La. 306, 256 So. 2d 98 (1971).
88. Generally speaking, the identity of a police informer need not be disclosed to
defendant on a motion to suppress evidence seized on the basis of information provided
by the informer. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), is the leading case. The
Louisiana supreme court reaffirmed the informer's privilege in at least two cases this
term. See State v. Howard, 283 So. 2d 197 (La. 1973); State v. Howard, 283 So. 2d
199 (La. 1973).
89. See State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 313, 256 So. 2d 98, 101-04 (1971) (dictum).
90. 273 So. 2d 34 (La. 1973).
91. Id. at 36 (dictum). Both Anselmo and George are discussed in The Work of
the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-CriminalProcedureI, 34 LA.
L. REV. 396, 409-10 (1974).
92. 284 So. 2d 873 (La. 1973).
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suppress, alleging that the affiant police officer knowingly falsified
the facts in his application for a warrant. In support of these allegations, defendant alleged the state had stipulated at a prior hearing
that there were no eye-witness identifications in the case. These allegations were sufficient, Justice Dixon said, to require an evidentiary
hearing on whether the affiant officer was telling the truth in his
application for a warrant to search defendant's apartment. Several
reasons support this result, albeit the court has now adopted what is
a minority position among the states. 3 If the affidavit is inaccurate,
probable cause for the warrant may not exist, and to permit an affiant
to execute an affidavit that is inaccurate is to allow the affiant rather
than the magistrate to make the determination of probable cause.
Requests for search warrants are ex parte and are frequently made
under circumstances not conducive to a considered determination of
probable cause; therefore these initial findings of cause should not be
beyond the review of a district judge on a motion to suppress. Finally,
to secure the people's right of privacy and to protect judicial integrity, untrue allegations of an affiant must be subject to judicial examination." In Melson's companion case, the court made it clear, however, that defendant is not entitled to a hearing contesting the affiant's veracity in every case as a routine matter. The defendant must
specify the particdar averments in the affidavit which are claimed to
be false, and there must be at least a minimal offer of proof indicating
some good reason for doubting the truthfulness of the affidavit.9
II.

PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION

Due process of law forbids the prosecution from using pretrial
identification procedures that are unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification;" and in determining whether
a particular procedure is conducive to mistaken identification a reviewing court under the fourteenth amendment must look to all the
93. Justice Summers' dissenting opinion in the Melson case thoroughly discusses
all the cases from other jurisdictions which support the majority rule against allowing
collateral attack on search warrant affidavits. See State v. Melson, 284 So. 2d 873, 87779 (La. 1973) (Summers, J., dissenting). For a list of those jurisdictions outside Louisiana allowing collateral attack on the affidavit, see The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Criminal ProcedureI, 34 LA. L. REv. 396, 409 n.46
(1974).
94. See State v. Melson, 284 So. 2d 873, 874-75 (La. 1973).
95. See State v. Giordano, 284 So. 2d 880 (La. 1973).
96. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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surrounding circumstances" 7-or at least to some of them. The absence of a lawyer representing the accused at the pretrial identification is not fatal, provided the lineup identification takes place before
any indictment or information is filed against the accused." What
controlled in State v. Newman," however, was that the identification
confrontation between the witness and the accused was a one-on-one
showup, with the accused behind one-way glass, and there is a general prohibition against this kind of identification procedure, subject
to a few, limited exceptions. 00° In Newman there was no exigency
requiring a showup. The accused was in custody at the police station,
and there was no good reason why the police could not have conducted a full-fledged lineup. All the necessary facilities to do so were
available at the police station, and in this situation the risk of misidentification inherent in a one-on-one confrontation can easily be
avoided by using a lineup procedure instead. Finally, the court considered one more feature of the case unduly suggestive: the witness'
mother kept pointing the accused out to the witness saying "that's
the man."''
However in these identification cases, the fact that the court
condemns the pretrial identification procedures used as unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to misidentification is not an end to the
case. An eyewitness can still identify the defendant at trial as the
perpetrator of the offense if the prosecution can show by clear and
convincing evidence that the witness' in-court identification is based
upon observations of the suspect other than the tainted pretrial confrontation. 02 This is the so-called "independent source" test, and in
Newman the court applied the test and concluded that the witness'
in-court identification was not independent of the tainted showup at
consequently reversed
the police station. Newman's conviction was
03
and the case was remanded for new trial.
97. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
98. Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) with Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972). See State v. Daniel, 297 So. 2d 417 (La. 1974) (applying Kirby to
Louisiana criminal practice and holding counsel is unnecessary at a preindictment
line-up); accord, State v. Drumgo; 283 So. 2d 463 (La. 1973).
99. 283 So. 2d 756 (La. 1973).
100. One exception permits a one-on-one confrontation between the accused in
custody and a witness where the accused is apprehended within a relatively short time
and is returned to the scene of the crime for on-the-spot identification. See State v.
Bland, 260 La. 153, 255 So. 2d 723 (1971).
101. State v. Newman, 283 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1973).
102. See United States v.Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
103. Justice Dixon detailed the factors to be taken into account when judging an
issue of independent source. State v. Newman, 283 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1973). The
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In State v. Moseley,"4 the court affirmed defendant's conviction
for armed robbery because the victim's trial identification had an
independent source. But for Justice Barham, who alone dissented,
the one-on-one showup in the case was so egregiously prejudicial
"that I can not countenance the in-court identification as being based
upon any extraneous independent recognition factors."'' 5 Apparently
Justice Barham would have the court adopt a strict rule of reversal
in order to deter unnecessarily suggestive identification confrontations, regardless of whether the witness independently recognizes the
defendant at trial. While this may be going too far, other members
of the court should follow Justice Barham's lead and at least give
some attention to the problem of enforcing due process requirements
regarding fair identification procedures. Saying in case after case that
there is evidence of independent source and affirming defendant's
conviction on that ground leaves the police wholly free to use whatever identification procedures they like, however suggestive and
however conducive to misidentification these procedures are. Surely
some judicial control in cases of flagrant abuse of identification techniques is necessary. What the court could do in such cases is to skew
application of the independent source test-that is, the court could
reverse the conviction, saying there is no evidence of independent
source when there really is, as a means of condemning the prejudicial identification procedures employed in a particular case. A better
approach would be to acknowledge the problem of remedy forthrightly and to try to devise some enforcement mechanism for assuring
the due process requirement of fair identification procedures. One
way the court might begin is to announce its willingness to exclude
all identification testimony-extra-judicial and in-court-as a
prophylactic, should the police continue to exploit the kind of unfair
identification procedures evident in Moseley."
Justice Barham did carry a majority of the supreme court with
him in State v. Wallace, °7 in which the court sustained defendant's
United States Supreme Court has also listed such factors in United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967), and one of these factors, the failure of the witness to identify
the defendant on a prior occasion, proved important in a case after Newman. See State
v. Wallace, 285 So. 2d 796 (La. 1973).
104. 284 So. 2d 749 (La. 1973).
105. Id. at 753 (Barham, J., dissenting).
106. The confrontation was one-to-one in Moseley, and at the time defendant was
identified he was in his jail cell. Two of the robbery victims were told the police had
captured the robber, and they were then asked to come to the police station to identify
him. No good reason appears in the case why the police could not have used a fullfledged lineup. Cf. State v. Newman, 283 So. 2d 756 (La. 1973).
107. 285 So. 2d 796 (La. 1973).
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due process objection that his photographic identification by the victim of the robbery was fundamentally unfair and conducive to misidentification. Three days before the trial in Wallace, the district
attorney subpoenaed the victim and asked him to pick out the men
who robbed him from two photographic arrays, each of which contained five pictures. At the time the victim was told "that the accused was on there and I picked out who I thought it was."' 8 In the
supreme court's view, this identification was not part of the investigatory stage: the defendants had already been arrested when the victim
was shown the photographic arrays. Moreover, "[w]hile the prosecution has a right to 'prepare witnesses,' it does not have the right to
'prompt witnesses.' "108 Justice Barham noted the danger of misidentification when photographs are used to identify a suspect, the possibility of abuse of photographic identification procedures, and the fact
that photographic identification is far inferior to a fairly conducted
lineup; he also said that after a suspect is in police custody, there is
seldom any justification for using photo-identification.'
III.

POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS

The court this term in State v. Levy"' had the chance to apply
the rule that on-the-scene police questioning as to facts surrounding
a crime is not affected by the Miranda decision. The police asked a
woman sitting in a car what her name was and whether she was the
wife of a man who had just been shot in a restaurant-bar. She replied,
"Yes, that's my husband, and I shot the son of a bitch." These questions were investigatory in nature-to determine whether the woman
was indeed the suspect sought-and no Miranda warnings were required before the police could ask them. Moreover, the incriminating
response was admissible against the defendant at trial. Also, as soon
as the defendant said she shot her husband, the officer in order to
108. Id. at 798.
109. Id. at 801, citing Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving
Limitations on the Abuse of Pre-Trial CriminalIdentification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 261, 297 (1971).
110. 285 So. 2d at 800-01. The court also found no independent source for the incourt identification.
In both Newman and Wallace the prosecution, without any indication that there
was a pretrial identification, asked the witness at trial to identify the defendant as the
perpetrator. This fairly common practice seems to place defense counsel at a disadvantage. What is almost imperative then is to ask the witness on cross-examination
whether there was any pretrial identification and, if so, to explore the possibility of
taint owing to an unfair showup or photographic identification.
111. 292 So. 2d 220 (La. 1974).
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protect himself asked her where the gun was. The officer retrieved the
gun from defendant's purse after being told where it was by the
defendant. The court ruled that the gun was admissible at trial because the officer's question about the location of the gun "was not so
much custodial interrogation, as rather being in aid of a limited protective search by an investigating officer founded on substantial reason.'"

2

IV.

BAIL

Bail in criminal cases in Louisiana has always been considered
a fundamental right, protected by the state constitution,"' and all
offenses regardless of their nature are bailable, with but one exception. According to Article I, §18 of the Louisiana Constitution and
article 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the offense charged
is "capital" then the accused is not entitled to bail so long as the
proof is evident and the presumption great that the accused is guilty
as charged. Under Louisiana law a "capital" offense is one that may
be punished by death."4 For a while in Louisiana right after Furman
v. Georgia,"5 which struck down the death penalty as then administered in most states, imposition of the death penalty was impossible,
save a legislative attempt to narrow the circumstances of the penalty's imposition. But under the "classification of crimes" standard
of State v. Holmes"6 and State v. Flood,"7 bail in Louisiana remained
unavailable for all offenses classified as capital in the Criminal Code
regardless of the fact that the death penalty could no longer be imposed as the law then stood. However, during 1973 the Louisiana
legislature amended title 14 of the Revised Statutes and redefined
murder by degrees, providing death as the penalty for first degree
murder."' This term in State v. Rhymes,"' an aggravated rape case,
the Louisiana supreme court, reaffirming the Holmes and Flood
112. Id. at 222.
113. LA. CONST. art. I, § 18; La. Const. art. I, § 12 (1921).
114. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 933(2).
115. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
116. 263 La. 685, 269 So. 2d 207 (1972).
117. 263 La. 700, 269 So. 2d 212 (1972). The "classification of crimes" standard
holds that murder, for instance, is still a "capital" crime even after Furmanv. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972); only the penalty has changed. "True, the penalty is what made
murder a capital offense, and it is not actually a capital offense in Louisiana today.
But the nature of the offense has not changed-only the punishment." State v. Flood,
263 La. 700, 705, 269 So. 2d 212, 214 (1972).
118. See LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1973).
119. 284 So. 2d 923 (La. 1973).
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cases, said: "The actions of the legislature since those two decisions
show no intention to abandon the classification system there recognized, but rather a legislative intent to maintain the division of
offenses into capital and non-capital crimes. ' ' 2 Thus, so long as the
offense is classified "capital" in the Criminal Code, as is aggravated
rape, bail is unavailable in Louisiana.
V.

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Most states permitting felony prosecutions by information require a bindover at a preliminary hearing as a jurisidictional prerequisite to the filing of the information with the trial court.,' But
Louisiana permits an information to be filed directly by the district
attorney without a preliminary hearing, and it used to be the law in
Louisiana that a defendant is not entitled of right to a preliminary
hearing once the district attorney files his bill of information in the
trial court charging the defendant with crime.' But there are indications that Louisiana's preliminary hearing practice is changing, and
the change is in the direction of ordering preliminary examinations
of right in all felony cases if the defendant wants a probable cause
hearing, regardless of whether the district attorney files a bill of information in the case and regardless of when the bill is filed. This would
be a significant change in the law because article 292 of the Code cuts
off the right to a preliminary hearing in a felony case when an information is filed; the matter of ordering a preliminary examination is
then left up to the discretion of the trial judge.' Some of the orders
for preliminary hearings entered by the court this term on supervisory
writs indicate that a majority of the court is willing to order a preliminary hearing in a felony case as of right, regardless of the filing of an
information,' but there are some writ refusals the other way that
120. Id. at 925.
121. See HALL, KAMISAR, LAFAVE & ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 977 (4th
ed. 1974).
122. State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568 (1970), is the leading case to this
effect.
123. "After the finding of an indictment or the filing of an information an order
for a preliminary examination in felony cases may be granted by the court at any time
either on its own motion or on request of the state or of the defendant." LA. CODE CRIM.
P. art. 292 (emphasis added).
124. See State v. Smith, 293 So. 2d 181 (La. 1974); State v. Jackson, 282 So. 2d
526 (La. 1973). In State v. Coleman, 290 So. 2d 906 (La. 1974), the court ordered a
preliminary hearing on a felony charge, but the court expressly noted that "the trial
court judge was correct in denying a preliminary hearing on the two misdemeanor
charges which are now supported by bills of information." The Constitution of 1974
also expressly limits the right to a preliminary examination to felony cases. See LA.
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seem to adhere to the former practice of denying probable cause
hearings where an information has been filed.' 25 Nothing really dispositive on this issue has emerged to date from the Louisiana supreme
court; the court seems to be sitting still, waiting for something to
happen. But what?
There is a view that the fourth and fourteenth amendments require that arrestees held for trial upon informations filed by the district attorney must be afforded preliminary hearings before a judicial
officer without unnecessary delay in order to determine whether
probable cause exists for holding them. The district attorney is not a
judicial officer-or so the argument goes' 26-and some protective judicial screen analogous to the grand jury is necessary between the
district attorney and the decision to hold a particular individual to
prevent the detention from being constitutionally unreasonable and
violative of due process of law. Justice Barham acknowledged this
view in one case decided this term and intimated that article 292 of
the Code may be unconstitutional' in cutting off a probable cause
hearing simply because the district attorney files his information.
Justice Barham was referring, of course, to developments in the Fifth
Circuit-specifically, to Pugh v. Rainwater,'5 a case decided in 1973,
which holds that an arrestee who is held for trial only on the basis of
an information filed by the prosecution is constitutionally entitled to
a preliminary hearing before a judicial officer without unnecessary
delay. This Pugh case is currently before the United States Supreme
Court, and probably our own supreme court is waiting for Pugh to
happen there, before it acts dispositively here, in Louisiana. All that
can be said with any certainty, however, is that Louisiana's new
constitution will moot at least part of the problem for Louisiana after
it goes into effect. For under the constitution of 1974: "The right to a
preliminary examination shall not be denied in felony cases except
CONST. art. I, § 14. But see Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.

granted sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973) (holding the exclusion of
misdemeanants from preliminary hearings unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection).
125. See State v. Renard, 296 So. 2d 833 (La. 1974). State ex rel. Harvey v.
Baudoin, 292 So. 2d 245 (La. 1974).
126. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (accepting the argument
that a state attorney general may not constitutionally issue search warrants because
he is not the neutral and detached magistrate required by the fourth and fourteenth
amendments).
127. State ex rel. Harvey v. Baudoin, 292 So. 2d 245 (La. 1974) (Barham, J.,
dissenting from denial of writ of habeas corpus).
128. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 414
U.S. 1062 (1973).
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when the accused is indicted by a grand jury."' 29 As a matter of state
constitutional law, this new provision rejects the former practice, and
no longer should it be true that filing an information obviates holding
a preliminary hearing in felony cases if the accused wants one.
VI.

CHARGING THE CRIME

The law on charging the crime in Louisiana is changing too,
although the court is more blunt about what it is doing and why.
What the court is doing is sustaining indictments or informations
which under the old rules probably would have been adjudged constitutionally deficient for failure to state every essential fact of the
offense charged in the indictment. In State v. Clark, 30 for example,
the prosecution, relying on the short-form indictment authorized by
article 465 of the Code, charged that "'Clark . . .did violate R.S.
14:62 in that he committed simple burglary of the movable belonging
to Cathy A. Staff, located at 2286 Highland Road, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.' "' What was burglarized in the case was an automobile;
however, the charge against Clark only used the generic term
"movable" to allege what was burglarized. For two members of the
court, Justices Barham and Summers, the indictment's failure to
specify exactly what was burglarized was fatal under the requirement
of Article I, §10 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution that the indictment must state every essential fact of the offense charged.
That the law on charging the crime is changing, however, is
evident first from the fact that the majority affirmed Clark's conviction; the court upheld the indictment as sufficient, although the majority opinion in the case intimates that the "extremely technical line
of jurisprudence" of past cases would have required a reversal because Article I, §10 "has until now been interpreted as requiring the
indictment or information to state every essential fact of the offense
with which charged."' 32 Second, it is probably significant that Justice
Tate wrote the Clark majority opinion. During 1972-73, Justice Tate
suggested that the court should re-examine charging law in Louisiana, 33 and he proposed that, if the court, were willing to overrule the
older, ultratechnical jurisprudence regarding the validity of indictments, it should adopt a new and better waiver approach to reviewing
the sufficiency of indictments on appeal. If the defendant actually
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

LA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
288 So. 2d 612 (La. 1974).
Id. at 615.
Id.
See State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 733, 734-37 (La. 1973) (Tate, J., dissenting).
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knew what the crime charged was and if the defense was not prejudiced or surprised in any way by the indictment's flaw, then Justice
Tate suggested that defendant's failure to challenge the indictment's
defect at trial should waive it on appeal,'34 and the majority opinion
in Clark seems to have applied this waiver test in reaching the conclusion that the indictment in the case was sufficient." 5 Furthermore,
in a separate concurring opinion, Justice Tate assigned additional
reasons for affirming Clark's conviction, reasons which were quite
blunt and which cut beyond the particular situation involved in the
Clark case. After noting that in practically no modern American jurisdiction except Louisiana has the constitutional requirement of notice of the nature and cause of the accusation been interpreted so
rigidly, Justice Tate continued:
There is simply no functional reason for such interpretation
under modern-day legal procedures and in the context of today's
courts and conditions.
The defendant's right to know in advance of the trial sufficient particulars as to enable him to defend himself intelligently
can be adequately protected by the bill of particulars and other
discovery devices authorized and to be authorized.
Under the ordinary meaning of the language, it [Article I,
§10] should not be restricted to meaning that the defendant
must by indictment be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him-it should be sufficient, in the absence of
surprise or prejudice, that he be so informed by means in addition
to the indictment. 36
Then Justice Tate specifically suggested that the court should overrule State v. Straughan,37 which held unconstitutional legislation
designed to permit charging by name and article number of the offense, in order to allow the state legislature to provide for a simpler
and less technical indictment system.'
State v. Russell"9 takes another step towards making the law on
charging the crime in Louisiana more rational. The bill of informa134. Id. at 736.
135. See State v. Clark, 288 So. 2d 612, 616 (La. 1974).
136. Id. at 617-18 (concurring opinion). Accord, The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Criminal ProcedureI, 34 LA. L. REV. 396, 422-23
(1974).

137. 229 La. 1036, 87 So. 2d 523 (1956).
138. State v. Clark, 288 So. 2d 612, 618 (La. 1974) (Tate, J., concurring).
139. 292 So. 2d 681 (La. 1974).
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tion charged that Russell "'did violate L.R.S. 14:42 in that he
attempted to rape' " the victim. 40 What the prosecution intended to
charge, however, was attempted aggravated rape, as the reference to
section 14:42 of the Revised Statutes defining aggravated rape shows.
But under the Straughan case, reference in the indictment to the
Revised Statutes cannot be considered in determining whether the
indictment sufficiently states all the essential facts as required by the
state constitution, and so Russell argued that the information in his
case was fatally defective. But the court, with Justice Tate again
writing the majority opinion, concluded that the charge was sufficient. True, the charge was not a correct short-form indictment for
aggravated rape.' But had the language of section 14:42 been incorporated in full in the information, instead of by reference, the information would have satisfied the constitutional requirement of stating
every essential fact in the charge. Therefore the court could see no
logical or practical reason why the incorporation by reference instead
of a verbatim recitation should have a different legal effect-at least
in the absence of misleading reference. What particularly impressed
the court was the right of the accused to secure further amplification
of the charge by a bill of particulars. And, despite any technical
defect, the court was unwilling to hold the information a complete
nullity where no objection was raised at trial, where defendant actually knew what the charge was, and where the defendant was fully
able to prepare his defense. Finally, Justice Tate accomplished in
Russell what he has urged for some time now: the court expressly
overruled State v. Straughan "to the extent that the holding or language . . .is inconsistent with our holding today . . . ..

VII.

PRETRIAL DISCOVERY

The court rocked along as usual on pretrial discovery during
1973-74. What looked like a significant advance came early in the
term in State v. Woodruff,4 3 in which the court held that defendant
was entitled to know before trial on his motion for a bill of particulars
whether any dangerous weapon was found on or near the victim of
140. Id. at 682.
141. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 465 provides the following correct short form: "Aggravated Rape-A.B. committed aggravated rape upon C.D."
142. State v. Russell, 292 So. 2d 681, 685 (La. 1974). Exactly where the court
stands now on charging flaws is unclear in light of the gentle way in which the court
overruled the Straughan case. But it seems likely that the court will use Russell as a
springboard toward much more relaxed scrutiny of indictments and informations in
future cases.
143. 281 So. 2d 95 (La. 1973).
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the shooting and, if so, the make, model, serial number, and caliber
of gun found at the scene. Defendant claimed self-defense in the case,
and the information requested might have facilitated proof of defendant's claim. The pretrial disclosure required in Woodruff is analogous to that ordered in the Migliore case,"' in which the Louisiana
supreme court held that a defendant who is charged with possession
or sale of prohibited drugs is entitled to have a small sample of the
drug for independent, pretrial inspection by his own experts. But
Justice Barham's opinion for the court in Woodruff never expressly
mentions the Migliore case, probably for the reason that defendant
did not actually request to inspect any evidence at all; all defendant
wanted in Woodruff was information.
However six months later, in State v. Barnard,"' the defendant
wanted his own experts before trial to examine the murder weapon
and a cartridge removed from the head of the victim, evidence known
to be in the prosecution's possession and the principal tie between the
defendant and the crime. Distinguishing Woodruff, three justices of
the court, including one justice sitting ad hoc for Justice Marcus,
reiterated the general rule that there is no pretrial discovery of evidence in Louisiana criminal cases:
Essentially, we are requested here to extend pre-trial discovery procedures to criminal cases, something which the Federal
Courts have not required, and which our Louisiana Legislature
has deliberately chosen not to do. If such procedures are to be
adopted, it is the function of the legislature, not the courts, to
adopt comprehensive rules for pre-trial discovery in criminal
cases not only by the accused, but by the prosecution." 6
Implementation of the narrow right of discovery recognized in
State v.Migliore"7 was at issue in two indigency cases decided this
term. In State v. Glass,"' a prosecution for distributing heroin, the
defendant alleged his indigency and requested that a qualified chemist be employed at state expense to independently analyze the alleged heroin. The trial court turned defendant down and the Louisiana supreme court affirmed, saying "the defendant in the instant
144. State v. Migliore, 261 La. 722, 260 So. 2d 682 (1972).
145. 287 So. 2d 770 (La. 1973).
146. Id. at 774. At the last regular session the legislature failed to approve a
comprehensive two-way discovery statute for criminal cases developed by the
Louisiana State Law Institute. H.B. No. 175, 37th Reg. Sess. (1974), introduced by
Representatives Bagert and Simoneaux.
147. 261 La. 722, 260 So. 2d 682 (1972).
148. 283 So. 2d 696 (La. 1973).
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case has failed to make an adequate showing that independent expert
assistance should have been furnished him at the State's expense."'' 9
The court did not decide, however, that a defendant would never
have a constitutional right to have independent expert assistance at
the State's expense.
Finally, the supreme court rejected a spate of discovery demands
all based on the rule of Brady v. Maryland5 ° that suppression by the
prosecution of material evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process of law. The real problem here-and it has
never been adequately solved-is how to implement Brady's holding.
Is the accused to have a look at all the evidence in the state's possession to determine whether any is favorable? Or is the state's response
"We have nothing exculpatory in our file" sufficient? Usually the law
requires the defendant to take the state's word for it, unless the
defendant can show the contrary, which is almost an impossible
task. 5' State v. Baker'52 is typical in this regard. Moreover, in State
v. Thomas 3 the court rejected the argument that the defendant, not
the prosecutor, is in the best position to judge whether evidence is
exculpatory or not. This may well be true, but "under the prevailing
judicial interpretations, defendant may not require pre-trial discovery of the nature sought";'54 and so the problem of implementing
Brady v. Maryland remains: How is defendant to discover favorable
evidence in the hands of the prosecution without a look at the state's
files?
Perhaps the trial judge could take his own look at the state's
files. That was exactly the procedure employed in State v. Odom 55
this term, and there was apparently no objection from the district
attorney. The Louisiana supreme court said that defendant was entitled to no more than this, however. He could not inspect the prosecution's files himself. Still, what the court did not say in Odom is
equally important. The court did not say that what the trial judge
did was either wrong or an abuse of discretion, and so it might be a
good idea for defense counsel in future cases to ask for the trial court's
149. Id. at 697.
150. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
151. Professor Pugh has pointed out that it is difficult for an accused to show that
evidence favorable to him is being withheld, without access to it. See The Work of the
LouisianaAppellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REv. 306, 322
(1973).
152. 288 So. 2d 52 (La. 1973).
153. 290 So. 2d 317 (La. 1974).
154. Id. at 318.
155. 292 So. 2d 189 (La. 1974).
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help in determining whether any exculpatory evidence exists in the
hands of the prosecution. Moreover, and on a broader front, the trial
bench should be encouraged to exercise the wide discretion which
may be theirs'5' to allow pretrial discovery in cases of particularized,
demonstrable need-toward the noble end of serving the truth at
57
criminal trial.'
156. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 3.
157. Ordinarily, appeals in these cases are taken from the trial court's refusal to
order any discovery, But the scope of appellate review may well be different were a
determined trial judge to order pretrial discovery in the first instance in an especially
worthy case.

